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XIX Symposion of Greek and Hellenistic Law
This year the XIX Symposion of Greek and Hellenistic Law, organized by Adri-
aan Lanni (Harvard) and Michael Gagarin (Austin), took place in the States, 
in the prestigious location of the Harvard Law School. Beginning on the 
morning of August 26th and lasting for four days, the conference was opened 
by a video message recorded by Joseph Mélèze-Modrzejewski, who was un-
fortunately prevented from participating in person.  
Martin Dreher (Magdeburg), Die Rechte der Götter, after a short introduc-
tion on the role of Greek gods as founders of law, concentrated on gods 
as legal subjects. Although obviously invisible, the gods were perceived 
by the Greeks as persons who had rights and would – in case that these 
rights were intriged upon by humans – react against them. Thus that gods 
had the right to possess property, both immobile and mobile, although 
the actual administration was carried out by humans. Dreher showed how 
gods and goddesses could acquire new possessions by accepting gifts and 
dedications, benefit from the existing possessions by collecting rent and 
lease payments and even alienating their property, by selling land or free-
ing slaves in sacred manumissions. With regard to real estate he clearly 
differentiated between sacred land on which sanctuaries, altars, statues 
or other symbols representing the deity were to be found, and land, which 
was used for economic reasons. The second part of Dreher’s paper dealt 
with gods as protagonists in legal procedures, be they judges, witnesses, 
parties or patrons of their priests. The respondent was Philipp Scheibel-
reiter (Vienna).
Arguing against the idea that in Athens a voluntary abortion procured 
by a woman belonging to an oikos could be prosecuted either with a private 
specific action (dike ambloseos) or with a public action for hybris, Laura Pepe 
(Milan), Abortion in Ancient Greece, provided a new possible overall interpre-
tation of the confused fragments of a lost Lysian speech concerning this 
topic. While supporting the traditional opinion that an abortion procured 
by a married woman without the consent of her husband was considered a 
private matter to be resolved exclusively inside the oikos, she pointed out 
some particular circumstances in which abortion could be relevant also in a 
public dimension, analyzing non-Athenian sources that might provide some 
possible parallel frameworks. The respondent was Bernard Legras (Paris).
Maria Youni (Komotini), Councils of Elders and Aristocratic Government in the 
Cretan Poleis, reviewed the scanty epigraphic evidence from various Cretan 
poleis in which the words bolá (= boulé), preisageia (= gerousia) or preigistoi 
occur, in order to draw some plausible conclusions about the composition, 
duties, and role of the Cretan Councils and their possible relation with the 
other organs of the polis’ government (above all the kosmoi). Beyond the 
many differences in the institutions and in the political development of 
each polis, the available sources clearly prove the competence of the Coun-
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cils in some relevant aspects of the administration of public finance, 
although they give no indication either of their involvement in ju-
dicial matters or of their probouleutic authority, which were two of 
the most important duties of Councils in many Greek cities. This, in 
Youni’s opinion, might be due to the fact that, even though their role 
was not defined by law, the Cretan Elders, selected from the noblest 
and most powerful families, could exercise their influence through 
other magistrates who were members of their kin, or could use their 
authority inside their phyla or among their hetairoi. The respondent 
was Alberto Maffi (Milan). 
Reexamining a well-known and much-debated question among 
Greek scholars, David Phillips (Los Angeles), Hubris and the Unity of 
Greek Law, indicated first the three criteria by which the idea of a 
meaningful unity has to manifest specifically in an actual substantive 
or procedural law: namely, a significant similarity in the laws of two 
or more independent poleis; the presence of a substantive or procedur-
al phenomenon in a community composed of Greeks from different 
poleis; and a temporal continuity and persistence of a significant legal 
feature. Then, starting from the text of the law of hubris preserved at 
Dem. 21.47 and from the Aristotelian definition of the offence at Rhet. 
1378b14ff. and elsewhere, he provided and discussed several literary 
and epigraphic sources about hubris from different times and places 
that satisfy all these criteria. In this way, he supported the idea that 
hubris can be accepted as a term and a concept of “Greek” law, that 
was vital not only in the legal systems of various poleis but also in the 
vocabulary of the fledgling Greek international law. The respondent 
was Adriaan Lanni (Harvard).
In his paper Rhetoric as a Source of Law in Athens, Michael Gagarin 
(Austin) illustrated through some eloquent examples (Lys. 1 and 10, 
Isae. 11, Dem. 18, Aesch. 3) that the interpretation of the meaning and 
the applicability of the law to the case at hand provided by the ora-
tors in their speeches was the main guide on which the jurors could 
rely to determine their verdict. Moreover, if a particular interpreta-
tion of a law given in a forensic speech was repeatedly successful, that 
interpretation could have become authoritative, since there was no 
law that might have decided what exactly was the meaning of the law 
itself. From this perspective, forensic speeches represented the most 
significant source of law, in the legal sense, after the laws themselves, 
according to which the jurors swore they would judge. The respond-
ent was Stephen Todd (Manchester).
The purpose of the paper by Werner Riess (Hamburg), The Atheni-
an Legal System and Its Public Aspects, was to demonstrate in depth the 
more significant implications of principle that the Athenian democ-
racy’s insisted on the public accessibility of legal proceedings. To this 
end, he analyzed some aspects of the Athenian legal system in order to 
demonstrate that openness and visibility were semantic markers that 
lay at the heart of the understanding of justice and democracy: for 
instance, the dichotomy between hidden and public violence, which 
implied that only the latter could be judged as legitimate in court; 
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the necessity of publicity to qualify an act as hubris; the relevance of 
public speaking, which explains the emergence of oratory; and the 
choice of a certain kind of procedure by a private citizen, which was 
intended as a form of symbolic communication and as a part of the 
‘social drama’ typical of the Athenian democracy. The respondent was 
Victor Bers (Yale).
Lorenzo Gagliardi (Milan), Consensual Defects in Contracts and the 
Athenian Law on ‘Homologia Kyria’, critically re-examined the issue of 
the existence in Greek law of a systematic treatment of consensual de-
fects. First, he surveyed both the literary evidence concerning the rel-
evance of the law on homologia kyria in the Athenian legal system and 
its varying modern interpretations; then, against Wolff’s renowned 
Zweckverfügung theory, he formulated his thesis that the law on ho-
mologia recognized contracts based on the mere consent – i.e. simple 
agreement – of the parties and free from consensual defects (espe-
cially duress and fraud); even ‘real’ contracts required homologia as a 
necessary (although not sufficient) element for obligations to arise; 
any breach of this law allowed the wronged party to bring suit (gener-
ally a dike blabes). In support of his argument, he quoted and analyzed 
various sources, among which [Dem.] 48.54 and 56; [Dem.] 56.2; Hyper. 
3.13-5; Plat. Laws 916c-d and 920d; and Plat. Crit. 52d-e. The respond-
ent was Robert Wallace (Evanston).
After reviewing the different scholarly positions concerning the 
precise features and differences underlying the terms hypotheke (hy-
potithenai) and prasis epi lysei, Mark Sundahl (Cleveland), Secured Credit 
in Athens: Reopening the Debate, dedicated the first part of his paper 
to the theory developed by E. Harris in his 1988 article When Is a Sale 
Not a Sale? (CQ 38). In particular, he criticized with several arguments 
Harris’ thesis that both terms, hypotheke and prasis epi lysei, were used 
interchangeably to refer to the same transaction (so that the choice of 
one instead of the other was merely rhetorical), and that the question 
of who owned the collateral was not relevant for the Athenians, and 
moreover could not be answered due to the primitive state of Athe-
nian law regarding the transfer of ownership. Then, in the second sec-
tion, Sundahl examined two Demosthenic speeches (Against Lacritus 
and Against Pantaenetus) that could provide an important contribution 
to our understanding of Athenian secured credit, with comparison to 
some modern models of transactions. The respondent was Gerhard 
Thür (Graz-Vienna).
Athina Dimopoulou (Athens), Akyron esto: Legal Invalidity in Greek In-
scriptions, examined some epigraphic instances of the term akyron 
that, even in the lack of a systematic and uniform legal theory on the 
topic, can offer some indications on the concept of legal invalidity in 
Greek legal thought. Dimopoulou analyzed and discussed many occur-
rences of the akyron clause in Greek inscriptions of different places 
and times, classifying them in three categories. The first concerns in-
validity in legal decisions, especially in international agreements; the 
second has to do with the akyron clause in legal statutes, in the form 
of international treaties, laws, decrees and decree propositions; the 
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third involves invalidity in private transactions and legal acts, such as 
testaments, manumissions, and contracts: in this last case, the invalid-
ity clause in private agreements can shed some light against the idea 
that contractual liberty extended as far as to include even agreements 
forbidden by law. The respondent was Edward Cohen (Philadelphia).
Starting with a revised edition of a small, fragmented inscription 
from Philippi in Macedonia, Leopold Migeotte (Quebec), L’aliénation 
de biens-fonds publics et sacrés dans les cités grecques aux périodes clas-
sique et hellénistique, presented an analysis of the possibility to alien-
ate public and sacred land. On the basis of numerous epigraphic and 
literary sources Migeotte showed the different categories of land and 
distinguished between the domaine privé, private property, of poleis 
and sanctuaries, and the domaine public, public property. Usually only 
private property was put up for sale, and this would regularly concern 
land and houses that had been confiscated and were thus used in or-
der to secure the utmost revenue for the city or the temple. The same 
is true for loans the city or the sanctuary would obtain: only land that 
formed part of the domaine privé or revenues from the domaine public 
would be mortgaged. Thus he concluded that although public or sa-
cred land was inalienable, there was always the possibility to dispose 
of those parts of the property that was not occupied by public build-
ings or sacred structures. The response was given by Michele Fara-
guna (Trieste).
Eva Jakab (Szeged), Sale by Auction, showed that individual proprie-
torship in Ptolemaic Egypt was set against public interests, such as the 
proper and regular cultivation of arable land. Land that was not used 
could be put to auction immediately, the necessary procedure could 
even be instigated by anybody interested in obtaining the lot and was 
handled swiftly. Thus the state could ensure that none of the precious 
fields would lie waste. Still newly acquired ownership came under two 
conditions: only if the full price agreed upon at the auction was paid, 
full ownership was transferred. On the other hand, the former owner 
had the possibility to reclaim his land within a given amount of time, 
thus restricting the rights of the new proprietor. As argued in several 
other papers at this conference, the flexible concepts of ownership 
and possession in Greek law still form one of the main points of inter-
est in scholarly debate. Julie Vélissaropoulos-Karakostas (Athens) was 
the respondent.
Nadine Grotkamp (Frankfurt), The Ptolemaic dikasterion, concen-
trated on some procedural questions that had not been treated suf-
ficiently up to now. Comparing the Ptolemaic dikasterion to different 
courts attested in epigraphic sources from throughout the Hellenistic 
world, she firstly stated a difference: the pretrial anakrisis, common 
to legal procedure in the Greek polis, was not part of the procedure in 
Egypt, in her eyes resulting from the absence of civic officials within 
the settlements in the countryside. She rejected the hypothesis that 
the dikasterion was formed on the model of the foreign judges attested 
in Hellenistic times and argued that this concept is rather to be seen in 
the another type of court – the chrematistai. Both systems, the foreign 
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judges and the chrematistai, increased in their importance at the same 
time as the (democratic) dikasteria underwent a decline. The response 
of Joseph Mélèze-Modrzejewzski was read by Julie Vélissaropoulos-
Karakostas (Athens).
The paper by Adele Scafuro (Providence), Decrees for Foreign Judg-
es, focused on foreign judges (dikastai or diallaktai) who, especially in 
times of crisis, warfare, and corruption, were asked to judge and/or 
to reconcile the inhabitants of a city according to the city’s own laws. 
The decrees honoring them provide us with some important – even if 
sometimes messy – information about the procedure and the criteria 
they used: it is possible to assume, for example, that normally there 
was a procedural priority for reconciliation, even if sometimes there 
are indications that the judges were only instructed to judge, and even 
if, moreover, the priority for reconciliation should be more rhetorical 
than procedural. Particular attention was devoted by Scafuro to the 
analysis of the development and the alterations of the “emotive claus-
es” that often appear in the decrees, and in which the effort of the 
judges to bring the disputants into harmony, both by giving decisions 
and by reconciling, is stressed. Due to the absence of the respondent 
Eva Cantarella (Milan), the response was read out by Laura Pepe. 
Bernhard Palme (Vienna), Die Genese der bilinguen Prozeßprotokolle im 
byzantinischen Ägypten, showed that the transition from minutes re-
cording court-procedures in Roman Egypt, which were always doc-
umented in Greek, to the bilingual transcripts that are to be found 
from the last years of the third century AD on, is more than a mere 
change in the arrangement and presentation in the text. It reflects 
a change in the system of filing such documents, which had been in 
use in other parts of the Roman empire for several generations. The 
documentation is not recorded according to the chronologically ar-
ranged journals of the magistrates; after the reform – one of several 
enacted in Egypt under Diocletian in 298 – single files for every case 
were opened, in Latin and Greek. Moreover, Palme showed that this 
reform was only compulsory for Roman magistrates and their offices; 
at the lower administrative levels the traditional hypomnematismoi in 
Greek remained in use up to the middle of the fourth century AD. The 
respondent was Uri Yiftach-Firanko (Jerusalem).
In her paper Rechtshistorische Überlegungen zu Dio Chrysostomus’ Rede 
an die Rhodier Kaja Harter-Uibopuu (Vienna) analyzed the sophists 31st 
oration To the Rhodians from a legal perspective and treated several 
arguments presented by him in order to show the inappropriateness 
of the Rhodian custom to rename old statues for new honorands. She 
compared three main arguments in the speech to the epigraphic evi-
dence and could show that the reuse of honorific statues and the dis-
regard of other honors was in fact qualified as hierosylia and asebeia 
and could be seen as a crime against the state, just as Dio argues. On 
the other hand his first main argument, namely that the reuse of stat-
ues was an interference with the private property of the honorands, 
has no parallels in any literary or documentary ancient source. At the 
end of her paper, Harter presented a law from Lindos (1st cent. AD) 
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that authorizes and regulates the renaming of statues in the sanctu-
ary of Athena Lindia, by selling the right to have them inscribed to 
citizens and guests of the Rhodian town. The response was delivered 
by Delfim Leão (Coimbra).
At the end of the conference, Delfim Leão was designated as organ-
izer of the next Symposion in Portugal.
